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 Building the Minimum Wage
Germany's First Sectoral Minimum Wage and its Impact on Wages




The very rst minimum wage in Germany was introduced in 1997 for blue-collar
workers in sub-sectors of the construction industry. In the setting of a natural exper-
iment blue-collar workers in neighboring 4-digit-industries and white-collar workers
are used as control groups for dierences-in-dierences-in-dierences estimation based
on linked employer-employee data. Estimation results reveal a sizable positive av-
erage impact on wages in East Germany and no eect in West Germany. Size and
signicance of eects are not homogeneous across wage regimes (individual vs. collec-
tive contracts) and across the distribution suggesting spillover eects to wages where
the minimum is not binding.
KEYWORDS: Minimum wage, construction sector, linked employer-employee data,
dierences-in-dierences-in-dierences, unconditional quantile regression.
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Minimum wages (MWs) have been for a long time and continue to be brought up as
a panacea in discussions about labor market policy, equality and fairness. MWs are
implemented in developed and developing countries alike. The institutional designs
range from a nation-wide MW to regional and sector-specic rates. Some countries
rely on dierent levels of pay for younger and older or more and less educated
employees. Such great variety of institutional details reveals the manifold opinions
and beliefs in societies and governments across the world about the eects of the
MW.
Germany introduced its rst MW only in 1997 as a sector-specic MW in parts
of the construction industry. The MW covered blue-collar workers (\gewerbliche
Arbeitnehmer") in substantial parts of the main construction trade with dierent
rates in East and West Germany and was negotiated between organized employers
and unions of the industry. Since then sector-specic binding lower oors for wages
have been installed in several other sectors such as cleaning and postal services while
more sectors shall follow. There is unison that the MW in the construction sector
constituted a breach in the till then dominating reservation against MWs in the
political establishment.
Despite its seminal importance it has been little evaluated. This can be blamed
mainly on the lack of suitable data. K onig and M oller (2007) nd small positive
eects of the MW introduction on wages and negatively (slightly positively) em-
ployment eects in East (West) Germany using data from the Federal Employment
Agency that do not allow for calculation of hourly wages and a proper distinction
of those treated. The results on employment are challenged by M uller (2010) who
nds negative employment eects, particularly large for East Germany.
Evidence on wage eects of the MW from the UK reports a signicant increase
in wages and a compression of the lower part of the wage distribution (Machin and
Wilson, 2004; Machin et al., 2003; Dickens and Manning, 2004b). Studies for the
US emphasize the role of spillovers and eects of the MW on parts of the wage dis-
tribution where it is not binding (Katz and Krueger, 1992; Card and Krueger, 1995;
Manning, 2003). The institutional design of the German MW is closely tied to the
wage bargain on the sectoral level in contrast to many other countries' institutions
1and the MW was introduced as an additional lowest rung to the pay scale in the
wage bargain. For the Spanish setting which is somewhat more akin to the German
case Dolado et al. (1997) attribute a 6.21% wage gain to the existence of collectively
bargained sectoral MWs situated above the national statutory minimum. While the
general eect of unions and/or collective agreements on wages has not been con-
clusively settled yet for the German case (Stephan and Gerlach, 2005; Fitzenberger
et al., 2008) it remains an open question how the introduction of a lowest wage oor
determined in the wage bargain that is binding for all workers in an industry aects
average wages and the structure of wages overall.
The aim of this study is to shed light on the following issues: Did the MW truly
bite? Was there an average eect on wage growth and was such eect heterogeneous
across wage regimes? Are there spillover eects of the MW?
Owing to the initial introduction of the MW to certain sub-sectors of the industry
these questions can be evaluated in the scope of a natural experiment. One of the
few data sources in Germany that allow for calculation of hourly wages while oering
enough observations with industry information on the 4-digit level is the German
Structure of Earnings Survey (GSES; \Gehalts- und Lohnstrukturerhebung"), a
linked employer-employee data set. Based on two cross sections I can properly
distinguish between employees that were eligible to the MW and those that were
not. Due to the data structure two groups of employees in the construction sector
lend themselves naturally as control groups; blue-collar workers in establishments
that make part of the construction sector but are not in the treated sub-sectors
and white-collar workers in the industry. Based on a \dierences-in-dierences-in-
dierences" (DDD) estimation strategy these two groups are used as a means to back
out the treatment eect of the MW on gross hourly wages. Moreover the impact
heterogeneity along the wage distribution is analyzed with unconditional quantile
regressions as proposed by Firpo et al. (2009).
I nd a surprisingly large positive mean eect of the MW on wages in the treated
sub-sectors of East Germany. Average wages grew by 8% due to the policy. Coe-
cients estimated for West Germany are small and insignicant. The impact is not
homogeneous; while the wage growth for East German blue-collar workers under
individual contracting is highly signicant, the eect for those under the sectoral
collective agreement (CA) is not signicantly dierent from zero. Along the wage
2distribution the treatment eect for those under individual bargaining in East Ger-
many is highest in the lowest quartile but treatment at higher percentiles remains
positive and signicant albeit of smaller size. In West Germany the insignicant
mean eect for wages under collective contracts is complemented by a clearly posi-
tive and signicant treatment eect in the middle and upper part of the distribution.
This study is a rst step in evaluating the impact of sectoral MWs that are set in
the scope of the wage bargain. The evidence suggests that the institutional setting
at hand is a lot more conducive to spillovers and hence larger wage eects of the
MW than under statutory MWs. It also underlines that a MW introduction may
aect wage dispersion and may increase wages that were not the initial target of the
MW policy.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briey reviews
theoretical and empirical literature on the topic while Section 3 summarizes the
state of the German construction sector at the time of the MW introduction and its
institutional design. In Section 4 details on the data source are presented, sample
selection and group assignment are discussed and descriptive statistics provided.
Section 5 illustrates the estimation strategies whose results are presented in Section
6. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Previous Literature
Although MWs remain one of the most studied elds in economics the evidence
does not argue conclusively in favor of one of the two sides of the political debate.
Theory has derived antagonistic results with regard to employment eects depending
on assumptions. Assuming compliance the eect on wages that were below the MW
before its introduction clearly has to be positive.
Economists have developed theoretical models that explain eects of the MW
on wages higher up in the wage distribution (see Neumark and Wascher (2008)
for a concise overview also on empirical evidence). If rms substitute low qualied
employees with better qualied employees to even up wages and worker productivity
wages of the later increase according to Pettengill (1981). These spillover eects
decrease along the distribution. A competing explanation is presented by Manning
(2003); in the framework of an equilibrium search model with monopsonistic rms
3employers that pay generous wages to hire workers matched with low-wage rms
have to increase their wage oers even further after the introduction of the MW to
hire enough workers. Again, this eect is strongest for rms that used to pay just a
little more than the new MW.
Grossman (1983) explains spill-overs of the MW with the need to maintain the
wage hierarchy. More skilled workers are better paid but their eort depends on the
relative distance in pay to the low-skilled workers that experience a wage hike due
to the MW introduction. This gives rise to a twofold pressure on the wages of the
more skilled; for one, the employers' attempt to substitute the low-skilled workers
with more skilled workers shifts demand, for two, the more skilled workers would
reduce their eort in view of the smaller wage dierential relative to the less-skilled
workers, if their own wages were not increased accordingly as well. Finally, a recent
model proposed by Dittrich and Knabe (2010) implements the Kalai-Smorodinsky
bargaining solution as opposed to the common Nash bargain that cannot explain
spillovers of the MW. Employers and unions agree on a bargain if their relative
utility gains are equalized which is dened as the ratio of the actual gain relative
to the maximum feasible gain. The introduction of the MW reduces the maximum
feasible gain for the employers as the best solution available now is moved up to the
statutory MW. The employers' bargaining set is thus reduced which in turn leads
to higher wages.
Given the questions at hand and the institutional setting of the MW in Germany
three elds of the empirical literature promise some useful insights to take away with:
(1) the vast literature on MWs, particularly its eects on wages and spillovers, (2)
the literature on the eect of the wage minima agreed on in collective bargaining,
and as a sidestep (3) the literature on the general eect of unions and CAs on wages
and wage structure given the importance of the social partners in the German case.
Compared to the very large literature on employment eects of the MW a com-
paratively small number of studies focuses on the eect on wages. In the UK the
introduction of the National MW in 1999 is used to analyze the impact on wage
growth and the wage distribution; Machin and Wilson (2004) nd for UK care
homes that on the home level wages rose signicantly with a spike a the new MW
and that the lower end of the wage distribution was compressed (Machin et al.,
2003). Dickens and Manning (2004b) detect an impact of the MW at the 5% per-
4centile that disappears at the 10% percentile, which conrms the ndings assembled
by Metcalf (2004). The overall eect on inequality is found to be small by Dickens
and Manning (2004a).
The ndings of little or no spill-overs run counter to evidence found for the US.
In an early study Grossman (1983) nds that wages for occupations just above the
MW see an increase at least in the short run as a response to a MW hike. Studies
by DiNardo et al. (1996); Lee (1999); Teulings (2000) also oppose the view that the
MW has little or no eect on the wage distribution. Manning (2003) follows Lee
(1999) and nds based on CPS data that for wages just above the MW spillovers
amount up to 11% of the MW yet the eect dies out at wages 50% higher than the
MW. Katz and Krueger (1992) and Card and Krueger (1995) analyze spillovers of
the MW in fast food restaurants in Texas; 16% of rms increase wages by more than
the MW hike actually forced them to and a large fraction actually maintained the
wage hierarchy. Amongst companies with a starting wage 5.88% higher than the
newly introduced MW 60% increased wages.
For Germany K onig and M oller (2007) studied the impact of the MW in the
construction sector on employment and wage growth in the familiar \dierence-in-
dierences" (DD) framework with data from the Federal Employment Oce. They
found a positive and signicant eect on wage growth due to the MW introduction
for both parts of the country ranging from 1% to 3% in East Germany and 0.5% in
West Germany. The control group is designed as employees situated slightly higher
up in the wage distribution and no statement beyond the mean eect can be made.
If there were any spillover eects of the MW, wage growth would be underestimated
by construction of control group. Employment eects turn out negative (slightly
positive) in East (West) Germany. Particularly the results for West Germany were
hotly debated amongst economists and in the media (Storbeck, 2007; Kluve and
Schmidt, 2007; Meier and Munz, 2008) in view of the choice of control group and
data restrictions, i.e. the determination of treatment and control group without
information on hourly wages. M uller (2010) uses semi-parametric estimation meth-
ods to gauge the employment eect based on the GSES for 2001. He nds small
negative eects for West Germany (1-2%) and signicant employment losses in East
Germany (4-5%).
Given the important role played by the social partners in setting the MW a closer
5look at the eect of union membership and more particularly collective bargaining
on wages is helpful. For the US there is a vast literature on the eect of union
membership (see Blau and Kahn (1999) for an overview, Card and Krueger (1995),
Firpo et al. (2009) inter alia). A eld less studied is the role of wage minima set in
the scope of collective bargaining schemes. Dolado et al. (1997) analyze the case of
Spain where collectively bargained minima covered about 85% of wage earners at
that time and were much more binding than the statutory national minimum. They
nd that the collectively bargained wages signicantly reduced wage dispersion and
observe wage gains between 6.21% (overall) and 12.32% (semi-skilled workers) at
the cost of non-negligible employment loss.
Studies on the eects of union membership in Germany in earlier years nd
mixed evidence; Schmidt and Zimmermann (1991) amongst others nd no direct ef-
fect of individual union membership on earnings for Germany, Wagner (1991) nds
a positive wage premium when restricting his analysis to blue-collar workers. Yet
union density has always been a lot lower than coverage by collective agreements in
Germany. In the year 2000, e.g., trade union density was only at 25% in 2000 in the
overall economy, but 68% of employees were covered by collective wage bargaining
(OECD, 2004, p. 145). This mirrors the fact that if an employer makes part of the
employers' association and only one of his employees is in the union, the tari is
extended to all his employees (for greater detail see Haucap et al. (2006, p. 363)).
Reliable information of union density on a sectoral level is unfortunately not avail-
able; anecdotal evidence suggests that deunionization did not spare the construction
sector despite the traditionally strong presence of unions in the sector. Particularly
in East Germany rms left the employers' association. Given the German institu-
tional setting it is generally agreed that the debate should not so much center on
the union wage premium but more on whether there is a (potentially additional)
premium to coverage by a collective contract.
Based on the linked employer-employee data set of the GSES Stephan and Ger-
lach (2005) nd that the expected wage of the average worker is higher in estab-
lishments under a collective contract than in the uncovered regime for full-time
employees in large manufacturing rms (100 or more employees) in Lower-Saxony.
In another study by the authors (Gerlach and Stephan, 2006) decomposition analy-
sis on the sample of blue-collar workers shows that under industry-wide agreements
6the dispersion of wages across and within establishments is always smaller than
under individual wage bargaining. Fitzenberger et al. (2008) reach quite dierent
conclusions based on a sample of male, full-time, working-age blue- and white-collar
workers of all industries in West German rms in the GSES of 2001. Controlling for
union density eects they nd a signicant positive eect of the share of coverage on
rm level wages yet a negative eect of individual bargaining coverage which even
increases along the wage distribution.
3 The German Construction Sector and the MW
Up till the 1990s the German construction sector was compared to other countries
highly unionized and had developed a corporatist system that ensured a compara-
tively high and stable pay for German workers (Eichhorst, 2005). In the following
years the German construction sector was stricken by the aftermath of the reunica-
tion boom and the dawn of the European unication. Earlier the number of posted
workers from non-European countries had exceeded those from European countries.
But the free movement of labor associated with the Single European Market had
brought ever more posted workers from EU countries. Although the number of
posted workers from non-EU countries that came to Germany based on bilateral
contracts had continually decreased throughout those years labor market tightness
continued to increase. With the abolishment of seasonal employment in 1993 policy
makers had de facto exhausted the tool kit of then available protectionist policies.1
Several other European countries faced a similar dilemma and the European
Commission presented a rst draft for a directive on posted workers in June 1991.
German legislation pre-empted the lengthy EU-level negotiations and passed its
own bill. Later on only slight modications of the German Posted Workers Act
(\Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz") were needed to comply with the nal EU directive
in 1996. For the Posted Workers Act to become eective the rate of the MW
had to be determined in the scope of a CA and declared generally binding via
the extension rule (\Allgemeinverbindlichkeitserkl arung"). These three interacting
1Meier and Munz (2008) discuss the role of foreign companies and workers in the light of
institutional changes at the time. They document a sizable employment decline in the construction
sector overall amongst foreign workers in the framework of the bilateral contracts in the early 1990s
and a stark decrease in numbers of posted workers after the MW introduction.
7pieces of legislation are discussed in detail below.
The CA on the MW is bargained by the organization(s) of the employers and the
unions within the general negotiations between the social partners on contracts for
their members in an area tari system. Negotiations typically revolve around the
tari for the basic wage which refers to employees with relevant 3-year vocational
training and some kind of further specialization or a few years of work experience.
In the main construction trade the geographic dierentiation of pay rates refers to
East and West Germany. In the wage bargain exemption clauses can be agreed on
that allow deviating alas lower wages or higher working hours if the employer faces
hard times. For the main construction trade exemption clauses included wage cuts
of up to 10% (5%) in East Germany (West Germany) while not underbidding the
MW. Some employers also opt to pay above the general pay scale.
CAs refer to the establishment level as opposed to the judicial entity of the rm.
In the main construction trade dierent agreements on pay scales are negotiated
for blue-collar and white-collar workers. Employees fullling typical construction
tasks are classied as blue-collar workers with the exception of head masons who
make part of the white-collar work force.2 As the highest ranking group involved
in construction task they are situated between their blue-collar colleagues fullling
construction task and white-collar construction engineers. The pay scale for blue-
collar workers was composed of more than eight dierent job grades at the time.
The extension rule declares the CA compulsory for all employers and blue-collar
employees in the sector regardless of whether they are member of the collective
bargaining parties or not. For the extension rule to be applicable the CA has to
fulll two requirements; for one it has to be passed in accordance with the law that
regulates the collective wage bargaining process (\Tarifvertragsgesetz"). Moreover
organized establishments have to employ at least 50% of the concerned employees
and the extension rule has to be of \substantial public interest".
The extension rule has to be passed by the committee of collective bargaining
parties (\Tarifausschus") that is made up of employee and employer representatives
in equal measure before the Ministry of Labor can apply the extension rule.3 The
2In the denition of skill groups in the basic agreement which the wage bargain refers to head
masons in the white-collar pay scale are called \Polier" whereas the highest ranked group of blue-
collar workers is referred to as \Werkpolier".
3 This also marks the dierence to a variety of other sectoral MWs discussed in Germany lately.
8process to declare the CA compulsory for all employees and employers in the sector
of the wage bargain was altered later on. In order to eliminate the employers' right
of veto in the committee of collective bargaining parties, the red-green coalition
that had come to power in 1999, changed the Posted Workers Act; since then the
CA on MWs can be declared generally compulsory by statutory regulation through
the Minister of Labor. Practically the application of the extension rule means that
when organized employers negotiate with unions about the (introductory) level of
the MW they make decisions about the cost structure of all employers in the sector
including their non-organized competitors.
The Posted Workers Act nally extends the scope of the MW now binding on a
national level with regard to foreign rms posting workers to Germany. The Posted
Workers Law thus allows to set minimum standards for foreign employees posted to
Germany if in conjoint with the commensurate extension rule on the industry level.
Along the way it opened the loophole for setting a MW for all German employees
in the sector.
The construction industry consists of several sub-sectors. In the ocial micro
data an establishment is assigned to the sub-sector where it generates the major
part of its value-added. To switch sectors an establishment has to shift the greatest
part of its economic activity.4 The social partners are grouped along the lines of
certain sub-sectors or groups of sub-sectors. Great parts of the main construction
trade are represented by two employers' organization (\Zentralverband Deutsches
Baugewerbe" and \Hauptverband der deutschen Bauindustrie") and one union (\In-
dustriegewerkschaft Bauen-Agrar-Umwelt").
Sub-sectors other than the main construction trade have traditionally their own
structures and negotiate their own CAs. Electric installation, roong, painting, and
wreckage in construction introduced sooner or later their own MWs. Therefore a
sizable part of employees in the construction sector became eligible later and/or at a
Most of those rely on the law for minimum working standards and are not negotiated by the social
partners directly.
4Employers could have tried to escape MW coverage by shifting the major part of their economic
activity to a non-covered sub-sector while generating a marginally smaller fraction of value-added
in economic activity typical of the covered sector. The combination of occupations, thus the
skill input by workers did neither change greatly in the covered nor in the non-covered part of
the construction industry; this indicates that dodging the MW legislation by switching industry
aliation is not an issue. Given the subsequent introduction of MW in neighboring sub-sectors
such behavior would have been quite short-sighted anyways.
9dierent MW rate than the majority of 4-digit-level sectors in the main construction
trade in January 1997. The MW introduction had been delayed by approximately
12 months owing to the rejection of the policy from the employers' side and ongoing
disaccord within the dierent bodies involved. The employers' organizations in
the main construction trade were not generally opposed to the introduction of a
MW. But the umbrella organization of employers was strictly opposed and halted
the introduction. As a compromise with regard to employers' opposition to its
introduction, the MW was to be reduced after its rst phase when it nally came
into eect.5
The MW is an hourly and establishment based concept that is thus dierentiated
with regard to its validity in terms of sectors covered and employees covered. On
the employee level only blue-collar workers above 18 and not on vocational training
are eligible, regardless of their tasks and level of education. A few professions are
explicitly excluded (i.e. kitchen aids, security guards, delivery and cleaning person-
nel). With the introduction of the MW a new wage group was created in the pay
scale of the CAs.6 It was agreed that this group should be situated below the till
then lowest paid group of unskilled laborers in non-construction occupations.
Table 1: The Development of the Nominal Mini-
mum Wage across Time (in e)
East West
January 1997 - August 1997 8.00 8.69
September 1997 - August 1999 7.74 8.18
September 1999 - August 2000 8.32 9.46
September 2000 - August 2001 8.49 9.65
September 2001 - August 2002 8.63 9.80
Source: Tarifsammlung Bauwirtschaft 1997/1998, 1998/1999,
1999/2000 and 2001/2002, Elsner Verlag.
In West Germany the MW nally set came equal to 90.55% of what the lowest
wage group had earned at the time the MW came into eect. In East Germany
this dierence was marginally smaller with 8.34 percentage points distance. Social
partners set the level of the MW without any formal knowledge of their competitors'
5More information on the political mayhem surrounding the MW introduction can be found in
German on http://www.boeckler.de/27758 21459.html
6In September 2003 an additional MW for workers with vocational training was implemented,
so called \ML2").
10wage structure. At the time of the MW negotiations no data base with reliable
hourly wage information dierentiated along wage regime was available. Table 1
shows the path of the MW from its introduction in January 1997 up till August
2002. The nominal MW increased by 7.86% (12,77%) in East (West) Germany
during this time.
4 Data, Dierentiation of Treatment and Control
Groups & Descriptive Evidence
4.1 The GSES
This study is based on ocial micro data from the GSES, the German salary and
wage survey (Hafner and Lenz, 2007).7 It collects every few years a cross section of
data from establishments (\Betrieb") with 10 or more employees. On the employee
level the GSES assembles information on wages, hours worked, overtime, (payroll)
taxes, education, job description, a rough classication of the tasks fullled in terms
of intra-rm hierarchy, and time with the employer amongst other things. On the
establishment level the region, the industry code, number of employees, fraction of
blue and white-collar workers, fraction of men and women, participation in CAs are
provided i.a. The data does not contain any information on job quits. As the GSES
makes part of the ocial micro data statistics establishments are liable to respond
if sampled and non-response is low.
I use two cross sections of the data for October of the years 1995 and 2001
and restrict the sample to employees between 18 to 65 years old, not on vocational
training or internships. The data allow for an accurate calculation of hourly wages
since the gross wage can be broken down into normal labor income and labor income
due to overtime, time worked on weekends, bank holidays etc. Any extra pay is
subtracted from the pay bill of October and hours according to contract are used
to compute hourly wages since the variable on hours paid only exists for 70% of
observations in the sample.8 For estimation results it does not make a dierence if
7Since 2006 it is called \Verdienststrukturerhebung".
8Hourly wage=[gross wage for October-remuneration for extra work-remuneration for shifts
worked-remuneration for work on weekends/bank holidays-remuneration for night shifts]/(weekly
work time according to contract*4.3)
11I use log gross hourly wage based on total working hours or log of monthly labor
income as the dependent variable instead of hourly wages based on hours according
to contract. Hourly wages calculated to be lower (higher) than e3 (e150) were
not considered in the analysis for plausibility. The data discern between individual
wage contracts, coverage by a CA, rm or establishment agreement. If not explicitly
mentioned otherwise the term \collective agreement" (CA) will be used as a synonym
for all three types of agreements in the following. The variable on the diculty of
tasks fullled captures dierences in education needed for the job and degree of
responsibility; yet it is not possible to identify the pay scale as implemented in the
CAs.
4.2 Treatment and Control Groups
The sectoral MW was passed on a national scale and dierentiated in its level
with regard to East and West Germany. For that reason geographical variation
cannot be used to construct treatment and control group as is commonly done in the
literature. Yet I exploit the fact that not all workers in the construction industry
became eligible. Two subgroups within the industry lend themselves readily as
control groups; blue-collar workers from other sub-sectors in construction and white-
collar workers. As explained in more detail in Section 5 I use these two control
groups together to back out the treatment eect that goes beyond general time,
(sub)industry, and worker type eects.
Table 2 outlines the choice of treatment and control group in terms of the 4-
digit-industry classication. Some sub-sectors of the construction industry are not
suitable neither for the treatment nor for the control group. The excluded 4-digit-
industries were overridden due to one of the following two reasons; (1) Industry
classication on the 4-digit-level changed between 1995 and 2001 from SYPRO code
to WZ93 in 2001. Conversion from one to the other is in some cases not unam-
biguously possible. (2) As explained in Section 3 a few other sector-specic MWs
were introduced from 1997 on. Sectors that passed their own MW rate in 1997 were
excluded. For simplicity the nally chosen sectors are referred to as \treatment and
control sectors" below.
Another source of dierentiation within the construction industry is the distinc-
12Table 2: Treatment and Control Group along the lines of the 4-digit-industry
classication, sectors that cannot be assigned in gray font
Treated sectors Industry code
General constructions or parts thereof; civil engineering 4521
Construction highways, roads, airelds and sport facilities 4523
Construction of water projects 4524
Other construction work involving special trades 4525
Control sectors
Plumbing 4533
Other building installation 4534
Floor and wall covering 4543
Painting and glazing 4544
Source: Federal Statistical Oce (http://www.destatis.de/EN).
Notes: Structure of the sectors and subsectors according to the German Classication of Economic Activ-
ities (\Klassikation der Wirtschaftszweige"), Edition 1993 (WZ 93).
tion between blue- and white-collar workers. MW legislation covers exclusively blue-
collar workers in treatment sectors. As the data set is a linked employer-employee
data set one observes wages for blue- and white-collar workers that are employed
at exactly the same establishments. In view of general shocks aecting an estab-
lishment white-collar workers thus constitute another natural comparison group for
their blue-collar colleagues.
4.3 Descriptive Evidence
Figure 1 displays the distribution of gross hourly wages in East and West Germany
before and after the introduction of the MW for blue-collar workers in establishments
in the treatment and the control sectors. For comparison gross hourly wages in 1995
were inated to 1997 and the MW rates as of October 1997 and October 2001 were
added as reference lines in the subgures for the covered sectors. Plots for the
control sectors display the familiar bell-shaped distribution of wages in both years
and both parts of the country in the control sectors. Inspection of the top left panel
shows that in East Germany a non-negligible range of wages of blue-collar workers
in the covered sector was below the MW to be introduced quite in contrast to the
West German situation depicted two panels further down. While the histograms for
eligible workers are of similar shape in West Germany for both points in time, this
13is not the case for East Germany after the introduction of the MW. The histogram
in the top right panel reveals a very pronounced heaping of wages to the right of the
MW for East Germany in 2001. For 2001 29.05% of blue-collar workers in the treated
sectors of East Germany received wages in the range of the MW and 10 percentage
points above. In West Germany this fraction amounts to a comparatively meagre
4.32%.
Table 3 further underlines the dierential impact of the MW across the country;
while in East Germany 10.65% of eligible workers have hourly wages below the MW,
this only holds true for 0.44% in West Germany. The Kaitz index as the ratio of the
nominal MW to the median of hourly wages further supports that the MW bit a lot
more in East Germany than in the West of the country. While the MW amounts to
81% of the median of gross hourly wages of all employees in East Germany before
the reform, the Kaitz index for West Germany equals 63%. The index is of similar
value for both regions in 2001 and comes very close to the Kaitz index as calculated
by K onig and M oller (2007). For comparison: In none of the OECD countries with
a statutory national MW did the Kaitz index (OECD, 2010) reach more than 55%
between 1995 and 2001, while the unweighted average across countries amounted to
roughly 35%.
Table 3: Details on Eligible Employees with Gross Hourly Wages below the
Initial Minimum Wage in 1997
East West
Kaitz index (median of wages in all sectors) 81% 63%
Kaitz index (median of wages for all eligible observations) 77% 63%
Eligible workers below the minimum wage
... number of observations 877 61
... average establishment size 36 48
... as a fraction of all eligible workers 10.65% 0.44%
... average age 34 30
... fraction low-skilled 55% 74%
... average tenure in months 23 25
Source: GSES 1995.
Notes: weighted calculations based on wages inated to level of 1/1997 using data from www.destatis.de.
Table 7 in the Appendix shows average characteristics of all workers in both
periods. Blue-collar workers in the treated establishments are predominantly male
14Figure 1: Distribution of Gross Hourly Wages in 1997 and 2001 for blue-collar
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Source: GSES 1995 and 2001.
Notes: own calculations based on gross hourly wages of October 1995 inated to October 1997 using data from
www.destatis.de. Reference lines plot the respective MW rates as of October 1997 and 2001.
15and work full-time (columns 2 and 3). Coverage by a collective, rm or plant level
agreement is particularly high in West Germany. The composition of occupations
in treatment and control group remains stable across time. Table 3 provides as
a comparison some average values for those earning below the MW prior to its
introduction. Not surprisingly it is on average the younger employees with less than
half of the average tenure in the full sample that are paid below the level of the
MW to be introduced. Those paid lower than the MW also work predominantly in
positions requiring less skills and training. On average they are employed in smaller
establishments. This is in line with the descriptive evidence of a study by M uller
and Steiner (2010) which shows that it is predominantly employees in smaller rms
whose wages would fall short of a hypothesized economy wide MW.
Compliance with the nominal MW rate would have meant a wage growth between
10.96% and 12.83%9 on average for entitled workers below the MW in East Germany
before the policy reform. Adjusting wages for those below the new threshold and
keeping all other workers in the eligible group at their actual wage level reveals a
hypothetical average increase of at least 1.17% for the overall group. In the Western
part of the country such nominal adjustment would have entailed a 11.80% to 12.59%
(0.05%) increase for those entitled below the MW (everyone entitled).
Table 4: Hourly Wages of Eligible Blue-Collar Workers at Selected Per-
centiles
q10 q20 q30 q40 q50 q60 q70 q80 q90
East
before 7.83 8.70 9.29 9.82 10.28 10.67 11.11 11.77 12.57
after 8.72 9.04 9.42 9.90 10.38 10.90 11.50 12.21 13.38
West
before 10.98 11.72 12.33 12.83 13.15 13.56 14.06 14.87 16.16
after 11.35 12.48 13.17 13.77 14.31 14.75 15.30 16.07 17.41
Source: GSES 1995 and 2001.
A rough comparison of quantiles of nominal hourly wages for eligible blue-collar
workers before and after the policy is provided in Table 4. The rst two rows
show that percentiles on the tails of the wage distribution grew in East Germany.
9The size of theoretical wage growth needed for compliance hinges on the assumptions about
wage ination between October 1995 and January 1997. Assuming the general hourly wage ination
for the entire economy should constitute a lower bound given the unfavorable developments in the
construction sector compared to the economy as a whole. As an upper bound the theoretical wage
growth under compliance with no ination adjustment is provided.
16The median nominal wage barely grew, yet the 80%th wage percentile increased
by 3.8%. What stands out most is the growth of the 10%-percentile; it increased
by 11.33%. Considering only the wage distribution of blue-collar workers under
individual contracts reveals that the distance to the median in that group more than
halved over time. For West Germany the picture looks dierent. The small change
in the left tail of the distribution increases along the percentiles and amounts to
around 8% in the right tail. The picture is again heterogeneous across pay regimes;
the median wage for employees under collective contract increased by nearly the
double amount compared to the median of their colleagues not covered by a CA.
The MW introduced to parts of the German construction sector cannot be com-
pared directly with other countries' experiences due to its deviating institutional
design. Yet, drawing on the literature of wages eects from other countries discussed
in Section 2, the set-up of the MW in the construction sector, and the descriptive
evidence presented so far dierent scenarios come to mind about the potential eects
of the MW. As it is unlikely that the higher labor costs were passed on into prices
given the price pressure in the industry at the time (also see Lemos (2008) for a
review of studies on the eects of MW on prices) and the scope for automatization
limits the substitution of labor with capital in the sector, the major impact of the
MW introduction should be detectable in the labor market.
Wages in the lower end of the distribution have to increase provided that the
MW was set at a level high enough to cover some part of the work force in the sector
and that there is compliance. On average one expects this eect to be large in East
Germany, but less so in West Germany where the descriptive evidence reported
above suggests that only a small wage hike was necessary to reach compliance.
Theoretically employers could try to cover up the extra cost incurred in the lower
end of the wage distribution by decreasing wages for those earning better than
the MW but given wage rigidities this seems highly unlikely particularly for those
employees under a collective contract.
Several explanations oer themselves for spillover eects of the MW. The wage
hierarchy argument may come in two guises; for establishments with individual
bargaining the MW could exert pressure on wages for those above the MW as
illustrated in Section 2. This would entail a spillover eect that is biggest on the
lowest tail of the distribution before it slowly dies out along the distribution. In
17the institutional scheme of the MW unions and organized employers are pivotal in
setting the MW rate as an additional lowest tari in the pay scheme. If the social
partners consider MWs as too high compared to the tasks fullled and the wage
received by the other taris in the pay scale, namely in view of the basic wage
rate, spillovers to skilled workers' wages will occur in order to maintain the wage
hierarchy. The impact of the MW should then also be detectable in the upper part of
the wage distribution. This again may exert additional pressure on wages for skilled
workers not under CA. Given that there is a collective wage bargaining premium
and unions strive to maintain it, they moreover may root for a shift of the pay scale
by the amount the original premium is decreased due to the introduction of the MW
and the subsequent wage increase for the non-covered employees.
Altogether mean eects of the MW on wages should be most pronounced for
blue-collar workers that are not paid according to the CA, potentially also with
spillovers, in East Germany where the MW is a lot more binding than in West
Germany. Hypotheses with regard to wage eects for employees not under CA are
less clear cut. If the MW introduction does not exert an upward pressure on the
wage bargain no signicant eects should be found. Yet, if pressure on parts or the
whole pay scale occurs the compression of the wage distribution in the lower part
of the wage distribution might actually be oset by an increase in dispersion on the
upper end of the distribution.
5 Methodology
5.1 Dierence-in-Dierences-in-Dierences Estimation
The construction sector went through troubled times in the 90s. The industry con-
tracted as a whole while anecdotal and descriptive evidence suggest further that
some sub-industries and establishments were hit harder than others by the down-
turn. In order to not confound the eects of the policy with general time, industry
and worker type eects the two control groups dened in Section 4.2 are used to
separate out the treatment eect. In the familiar DD framework the common trend
assumption must not be violated. Given the unequal pressure on the labor market
of construction industry's sub-sectors described above it is implausible to hold up
18the assumption that in the absence of the policy wages of blue-collar workers in
the treated and the control sectors would have experienced the same time trend.
White-collar workers in the treated sectors make a doubtable control group as well
in view of comparable time trends for blue- and white collar workers in the medium
run perspective.
The DDD framework holds the advantage that its identifying assumption is
considerably less restrictive. In this particular case it requires that in the absence of
the policy the dierence in time trends of wages for blue- and white-collar workers
in the treated sectors would have been the same as the dierence in time trends of
wages of blue- and white-collar workers in the control sectors. The DDD framework
thus allows for a dierential overall trend in control and treatment sectors as much
as for a dierential time trend in blue- and white-collar workers' wages. While
spillover eects on the control groups cannot be ruled out categorically descriptive
evidence shows no signicant change in the composition of occupations employed in
the treated and the control sectors, and wage bargaining occurs separately across
industries. The employees that appear the most susceptible of spillover eects in
the control group are head masons and foremen; they are classied as white-collar
workers in the wage bargain and the data yet their tasks are closest to those of the
eligible workers. As a robustness check this group of employees is excluded from the
baseline estimation and results do barely change (see Appendix).
Let the DDD estimator be dened as:
log(wagegm) = 0 + 1  bluegm + 2  postg + 3  sectorg
+ 4  (bluegm  postg) + 5  (bluegm  sectorg) + 6  (postg  sectorg)





gm + gm; (1)
where establishments are indexed by g = 1;:::;G. Blue- and white-collar employees
1 through Mg work for establishment g. log(wagegm) is thus the log gross hourly
wage for individual m working at establishment g. eg is a K 1 vector of establish-
ment specic covariates and pgm is a L  1 vector capturing explanatory variables
that vary within and across establishments, thus for each individual. bluegm is a
dummy variable equal to one if the observed individual is a blue-collar worker; postg
19is a dummy equal to one if the individual is observed after the policy change; sectorg
is the industry dummy and equal to one if the individual works for an establishment
in the treated sector; the error term is denoted gm. The coecients of the double
interactions with postg capture reform-independent dierential time trends that af-
fect all blue-collar workers or all workers in the construction industry covered by the
reform. The double interactions with bluegm control for time-invariant dierences
between blue-collar workers and other workers in the covered sector. The coecient
of the third-level interaction, 7, is the DDD estimate of the impact of the MW
reform. It captures the mean treatment eect of the MW introduction on wages of
eligible blue-collar workers in the treated sectors.
Several control variables are added to mimic a Mincer-type wage equation. Age
and age squared capture the typical age prole in labor income earnings. Dummies
control for gender and full-time work. The data set does not provide information
on work experience but includes information on time with the current employer. I
include tenure in months to account for potential eects of longer periods with the
same employer on wages. The variable on diculty of tasks fullled is recoded in
three dummy variables for low, medium or high qualications (reference category)
needed on the job. Finally, dummies for 5 dierent establishment size categories are
added with the smallest (10 to 20 employees) as the base value.
5.2 Unconditional Quantile Regression
The DD(D) methodology allows for identication of the mean treatment eect of a
policy. In the public debate the MW was presented as a means to better support
those employees receiving the worst pay. The target group of the policy are thus
the lower ranks of the wage distribution. If this promise of policy makers had come
true, one should be able to identify higher eects at the lower quantiles of the wage
distribution and lower, possibly zero or even negative eects in the higher ranks of
the wage distribution. In contrast to conventional OLS, quantile regression (QR)
models as rst introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978) allow to capture such
heterogeneous eects across the wage distribution.
Often covariates other than the industry dummy change along the wage distri-
bution, e.g. observations in the lower tail of the wage distribution are typically
20less educated and younger. Conditional QR estimates describe how the wage is
aected at a particular quantile given the explanatory variables. A drawback of
the traditional quantile regression approach is its limited scope for interpretation.
Unlike conditional means in a least-squares regression do conditional QR estimates
not average up to the unconditional mean. We can thus interpret conditional QR
coecients only as eects on the distribution conditional on observations sharing
the same values of covariates. Recently Firpo et al. (2009) proposed a new method
to estimate the impact of changes in the explanatory variables on the unconditional
quantiles of the outcome variable which they termed the Recentered Inuence Func-
tion (RIF) regression.
RIF regression basically consists of two steps; rst the dependent variable is
transformed via the RIF, second, a regression is run of the transformed dependent
variable on the explanatory variables. For simplicity i = 1;:::;N represents an
index across individuals that uniquely identies each observation in the full sample
and across time in the following. Each element of i thus corresponds to one single
combination out of the employer g and employee m identier. Let the unconditional
(marginal) distribution function of wages, Y , be FY(y) =
R
FY jX(yjX = x)dFX(x)
such that the the density of Y evaluated at th population quantile, q, is fY(q).
The RIF is dened as the sum of the distributional statistic of interest and its
inuence function which measures the inuence of an individual observation on the
distributional statistic. In the case of quantiles the RIF is
RIF(y;q) = q + IF(y;q) = q +
   1fy  qg
fY(q)
= c1;  1fy > qg + c2;;
where c1; = 1=fY(q) and c2; = q   c1;  (1   ). The RIF equals the underlying
distributional statistic in expectation. Conditional on some explanatory variables X
the expectation of the RIF can be written as E[RIF(Y ;q)jX = x] = c1;  Pr[Y >
qjX = x]+c2; and is termed unconditional quantile regression because its average
derivative corresponds to the marginal eect on the unconditional quantile. The
authors further show that the unconditional eect E[dE[RIF(Y;q)jX]=dx] is closely
related to the average marginal probability response model Pr[Y > qjX] and the
family of conditional quantile eects. In case of a simple linear relationship between
covariates X and the dependent variable estimation of the conditional expectation
21E[RIF OLS(Y ;q;FY)jX = x] = X0 leads to the unconditional quantile regression




i=1 Xi  [ RIF(Y ; b q).
For computation of [ RIF(Y ; b q;FY) b q and fY(b q) need to be estimated. The
estimate of the th sample quantile is deduced by solving




(   1fYi   q  0g)  (Yi   q):
The density of the Y is estimated using the kernel density estimator. In the second
step [ RIF(Y ; b q) is regressed on the independent variables.
In order to analyze treatment eect heterogeneity along the wage distribution
RIF regression is combined with the linear DDD model described in Section 5.1. Re-
gressors for the RIF regression are just the same as in the least squares specication
written out in equation (1).
6 Results
6.1 Dierences-in-Dierences-in-Dierences Results
For all specications additional controls such as age, gender, skill, tenure and estab-
lishment size were included. Table 5 and 6 summarize the main estimation results
of the DDD specication for East and West Germany. Detailed regression output
is supplied in the Appendix (Tables 8 and 9). Standard errors are clustered on
the establishment level in all specications to account for correlation of error terms
within establishments.
The rst column ("DDD") of Table 5 shows estimation results for the base spec-
ication (1). In the rest of the columns interactions of the variables blue, sector,
post, bluepost, bluesector, sectorpost, and bluepostsector with coverage by
a CA were added and dierent sample restrictions made. Model \200" restricts
the sample to establishments with up to 200 employees. This excludes only a few
establishments yet they provide many observations. The column to the far right
provides estimation results when the sample is restricted to employees whose wage
contract is not part of a rm or establishment level agreement. Firm and establish-
ment level agreements are typically found in larger rms but to smaller extent also
22in medium-sized companies.
Table 5: Overview of Main Dierences-in-Dierences-in-Dierences Results for
West Germany
DDD DDD-CA DDD-CA DDD-CA
all all 200 no rm CA
Blue*post*sector 0:017 0:056 0:055 0:056
(0:020) (0:038) (0:040) (0:038)
Blue*post*sector*CA  0:024  0:046  0:022
(0:044) (0:044) (0:044)
Blue*post*sector + blue*post*sector*CA 0:033 0:009 0:035
(0:024) (0:023) (0:024)
F-Test for dierential eects across coverage by a CA
... on intercept & slopes 11:03 3:01 11:02
... p-value 0:000 0:002 0:000
... on slopes 8:01 1:78 8:16
... p-value 0:000 0:086 0:000
R2 0:569 0:572 0:536 0:572
N 53651 53651 36939 53525
Source: GSES 1995 and 2001.
Notes: standard errors clustered on the establishment level in parentheses. ***signicant at 1% level,
**signicant at 5% level, *signicant at 10% level. The dependent variable is log hourly wages. \CA"
refers to collective, rm or establishment agreement. \DDD-CA" stands for least squares estimation
of the dierences-in-dierences-in-dierences specication dierentiated along union status. \<200" re-
stricts the sample to observations in establishments with up to 200 employees. \no rm CA" excludes
observations from establishments with a rm or establishment level agreement. For further details and
the full regression output refer to Table 9.
Results for West Germany conrm that there was no signicant mean treatment
eect of the MW. This holds across the dierent specications and sample restric-
tions. While point estimates suggest a slight positive impact none of the coecients
is signicantly dierent from zero. The magnitude of eects is stable across specica-
tions except for the overall point estimate (bluepostsector+bluepostsectorCA)
for the eect on blue-collar workers not covered by a CA in the sample restricted to
establishments with 200 employees, yet also this point estimate is insignicant. The
F-Tests reject that slopes (and intercept) in the interacted model are jointly zero
and support caution with regard to eect heterogeneity along coverage by a CA.
The negative and signicant base eect of coverage by collective contracting (\with
CA") are in line albeit a little smaller than the ndings by the study of Fitzenberger
et al. (2008). Compared to blue-collar workers in the treated sectors after the in-
troduction is the penalty for individuals under CA barely detectable (-0.5%) and
insignicant. Column \no foremen" of Table 9 shows that estimation results do not
23change when head masons and foremen that are classied as white-collar workers
are excluded from the regression.
Table 6: Overview of Main Dierences-in-Dierences-in-Dierences Results for East Ger-
many
DDD DDD-CA DDD-CA DDD-CA
all all 200 no rm CA
Blue*post*sector 0:080 0:130 0:109 0:130
(0:028) (0:036) (0:038) (0:036)
Blue*post*sector*CA  0:013 0:004  0:030
Blue*post*sector + blue*post*sector*CA 0:117 0:112 0:100
(0:063) (0:064) (0:070)
F-Test for dierential eects coverage by a CA
... on intercept & slopes 31:88 33:51 34:63
... p-value 0:000 0:000 0:000
... on slopes 5:60 6:33 4:86
... p-value 0:000 0:000 0:000
R2 0:579 0:585 0:548 0:591
N 27640 27640 21986 26903
Source: GSES 1995 and 2001.
Notes: Refer to Table 5 for general details and to Table 8 for full regression output.
In East Germany the mean treatment eect is clearly positive and signicant.
Dierentiation of the treatment eect along the wage contract regime reveals not
so much dierent magnitudes of the treatment eect as condence intervals for
those under individual wage contracts and those under collective or rm agreements
overlap. But while the treatment eects on those under the non-covered regime are
highly signicant in all regressions, estimates for those under CA are on the brink of
signicance. The base eect of coverage by a CA is large and signicant with 11%
in contrast to the results for West Germany. Amongst the blue-collar workers in the
treated sectors wages under collective contracts were 7.3% higher than for those with
individual wage contracts after the policy had been implemented. When employees
contracted under rm and establishment level agreements are left out of the sample
(column \no rm CA" in Table 6) the treatment eect is not signicantly dierent
from zero for those under collective contract. Compared to the sample restriction
with regard to establishment size (column \200") a lot less observations are left
out of the estimation but these observations stem from only a few establishments
24underlining the particular dimension of rm/establishment specic agreements.
The MW introduction led to an average wage growth of 8% for all entitled blue-
collar workers in East Germany. Further dierentiating by wage bargain regime
reveals a surprisingly high positive eect of 13% on wages of those under individual
contract which is close to the calculated theoretical wage increase needed for those
observations prior to the introduction below the MW. Regressions for the eect on
monthly earnings show the same patterns and magnitudes as those on hourly wages
for both parts of the country. Estimations on the eect of hours worked did reveal
no impact of the MW policy. In a next step, the question who benetted the most
along the distribution will be addressed.
6.2 Unconditional Quantile Regression Results
Figure 2 shows graphically the main coecients and the respective condence in-
tervals for RIF coecients. The two panels on the left refer to results for workers
under individual bargaining (a) and covered by a CA (b) for East Germany and
the panels to the right refer to the results for West Germany (panels (c) and (d)
respectively). Tables 11 and 10 in the Appendix provide detailed estimation results
at selected quantiles.
For West Germany OLS regressions found no signicant mean eect of the MW
on wages for non-covered workers. This result is conrmed along the whole distribu-
tion by RIF regression results. The coecients are quite small and never signicantly
dierent from zero. The mean eect for employees under CA was not signicant ei-
ther but RIF results show a non-homogeneous picture along the distribution. Up till
the 30%-percentile coecient estimates meander around zero and are insignicant.
Between the 40%- and the 80%-percentile coecients take a leap in magnitude and
signicance: estimates range between 5.4% and 10.1%, are highly signicant. The
MW thus had a sizable positive impact on the upper part of the wage distribution
for wage contracts under CA and wage dispersion increased. The pattern of coe-
cients and signicance does not dier if observations with rm level agreements are
excluded. It is also worth mentioning that the 40%- to 80%-percentiles encompass
those taris in the pay scale that apply to blue-collar workers that have completed
at least a relevant three-year vocational training.
25Figure 2: RIF Coecients of the Treatment Eect (DDD) on log Hourly Wages for
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26The treatment eect for blue-collar workers under individual contracts in East
Germany is positive along the whole distribution. It is highest between the 5%-
and the 25%-percentile and remains quite stable for the higher quantiles. It thus
decreased inequality in the lower part of the distribution. The picture of treatment
eects for workers under CA is less clear cut. Estimated coecients are positive and
the size of eects is quite stable across the distribution. Yet, in the left tail estimated
coecients are only on the brink of signicance on the 95%-level and just beyond
the 40%-percentile coecients are clearly signicant. If observations under rm-
and establishment level contracts are left out the magnitude of eects in this range
is somewhat lower and signicance also decreases. Taken together RIF-regression
treatment eects tentatively suggest a homogeneous location shift for workers bound
by collective, rm or establishment agreement in their wages contracts.
RIF regression results thus complement the information on mean eects. While
OLS regressions for West Germany suggested that the MW did exert no impact at
all on wages, RIF regressions reveal that for observations under CA a sizable and
clearly signicant eect in the upper part of the wage distribution took place. For
East Germany RIF regressions illustrated that the positive mean eect for workers
under individual contracting is associated with a large positive treatment eect at
the bottom of the distribution and still positive yet lower eects further up the
distribution, altogether decreasing wage dispersion. For blue-collar workers in the
treated sectors under CA a generally positive eect of the MW can be observed yet
with lower signicance just as in the OLS regressions.
7 Conclusion
This study analyzes the impact of the introduction of the rst sectoral MW in
1997 in Germany on hourly wages and their distribution. The reform was aimed
at setting a lower wage oor for blue-collar workers in the construction sector but
was not implemented across all sub-sectors due to institutional peculiarities in the
wage bargain. I use this as a natural experiment to dierentiate between treatment
and control group on the 4-digit-industry classication level. Based on two cross
sections of a linked employer-employee data set, the GSES, blue-collar workers in
non-treated parts of the construction industry and white-collar workers serve as
27control groups in the dierences-in-dierences-in-dierences regression framework.
Unconditional quantile (RIF) regression complements estimated mean eects and
gauges the impact heterogeneity along the wage distribution.
Descriptive results reveal that the MW bit strongly in East Germany and a lot
less in West Germany. Estimation results conrm that on average blue-collar workers
in the covered sectors in East Germany experienced a wage increase of 8% while I
nd no signicant mean eect for West Germany. There is heterogeneity along the
wage regime and along the distribution. In East Germany mean treatment eects
for those under the collective area contract are insignicant. Along the distribution
the impact is highest for the lower quartile of East German blue-collar workers
bunching up the distribution from below while the eect decreases but does not die
out over the rest of the distribution. For workers under collective area contracts the
evidence hints at a location shift yet coecients are on the margins of signicance.
In West Germany the treatment eect is insignicant along the entire distribution
for employees under individual wage bargaining. Yet in the upper part of the wage
distribution there can clearly be observed a positive eect of treatment interacted
with collective (and rm or establishment level) wage bargaining status that brings
about a dispersion of wages.
Altogether these results suggest that the introduction of the MW had a sizable
impact on wages and distribution of blue-collar workers in the treated sectors par-
ticularly in East Germany. But the eect did not take place homogeneously across
the wage distribution and the pay scheme. Apart from sizable spillover eects evi-
dence for West Germany points to the fact that the MW introduction also aected
wages of those paid under a collective, rm or establishment agreement despite the
fact that the nominal pay scale was not bound by the MW. The pivotal role played
by unions in the setting of the MW and the strive to maintain to wage hierarchies
and/or the collective bargaining wage premium may serve as explanations for this
somewhat unexpected result. The identication of the particular mechanisms in the
interaction of wage bargaining and MWs are beyond the scope of this study but pose
interesting questions for future research in economic theory as much as empirical
work. Policy makers should be aware that MWs may hold consequences not only
for the lowest part of the wage distribution and that benets may also accrue to
employees that were actually not the policy's target group.
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32Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for East and West Germany
Treated Sectors Control Sectors
Blue-collar White-collar Blue-collar White-collar












Average establishment size 43 31 46 33 28 19 29 20
Percentage under (collective) agreement 54% 33% 54% 35% 40% 18% 41% 11%
Percentage female 0% 0% 44% 37% 1% 1% 49% 49%
Percentage working full-time 100% 98% 93% 89% 100% 99% 90% 83%
Average Age 37 39 42 43 36 38 41 43
Fraction low-skilled 30% 27% 14% 13% 15% 11% 22% 22%
Fraction medium-skilled 59% 60% 55% 54% 73% 73% 47% 51%
Average tenure in months 72 76 89 98 76 76 91 90
Average hourly wage 9.93 10.48 14.36 15.90 9.03 9.32 11.56 12.85
Average contracted monthly hours 169 168 166 161 171 171 166 158
Number of employees (unweighted) 11595 3871 2886 983 4646 1902 1229 528












Average establishment size 40 37 44 37 22 20 22 20
Percentage under (collective) agreement 92% 77% 80% 58% 69% 53% 54% 40%
Percentage female 0% 0% 32% 32% 2% 2% 47% 48%
Percentage working full-time 100% 98% 90% 87% 99% 97% 85% 73%
Average age 41 41 42 43 37 38 41 42
Fraction low-skilled 26% 27% 15% 17% 16% 22% 22% 32%
Fraction medium-skilled 50% 50% 49% 43% 55% 51% 50% 41%
Average tenure in months 112 109 133 122 108 111 137 122
Average hourly wage 13.13 14.29 18.48 20.79 12.95 13.51 16.22 16.83
Average contracted monthly hours 168 167 161 157 164 163 153 141
Number of employees (unweighted) 18254 9512 6275 3394 5956 5605 2173 2482
Number of establishments (unweighted) 719 460 679 456 391 393 375 392
Notes: The calculations are weighted unless stated otherwise.
Source: GSES 1995 and GSES 2001.
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3Table 8: Dierences-in-Dierences-in-Dierences Estimation Results for East
Germany
DDD DDD-CA DDD-CA DDD-CA DDD-CA
all all 200 no rm CA no foremen
Blue*post*sector 0:080 0:130 0:109 0:130 0:136
(0:028) (0:036) (0:038) (0:036) (0:038)
Blue*post*sector*CA  0:013 0:004  0:030  0:016
(0:076) (0:079) (0:083) (0:078)
Blue*post*CA  0:083  0:057  0:065  0:085
(0:068) (0:071) (0:076) (0:071)
Blue*sector*CA 0:087 0:059 0:085 0:090
(0:029) (0:030) (0:029) (0:030)
Post*sector*CA 0:008 0:008  0:001 0:011
(0:075) (0:064) (0:079) (0:079)
Blue*CA  0:034  0:026  0:032  0:029
(0:025) (0:026) (0:025) (0:026)
Post*CA 0:004  0:028 0:013 0:006
(0:066) (0:054) (0:070) (0:070)
Sector*CA  0:006 0:039  0:001  0:009
(0:029) (0:029) (0:029) (0:032)
Blue*post  0:098  0:093  0:092  0:093  0:093
(0:023) (0:027) (0:028) (0:027) (0:028)
Blue*sector  0:095  0:145  0:129  0:144  0:162
(0:013) (0:020) (0:021) (0:020) (0:022)
Post*sector  0:064  0:071  0:050  0:072  0:077
(0:032) (0:037) (0:039) (0:037) (0:039)
Blue  0:296  0:280  0:282  0:280  0:279
(0:012) (0:016) (0:018) (0:017) (0:018)
Post 0:154 0:153 0:153 0:154 0:154
(0:026) (0:029) (0:029) (0:029) (0:030)
Sector 0:175 0:181 0:163 0:181 0:198
(0:015) (0:020) (0:021) (0:020) (0:022)
With CA 0:111 0:110 0:098 0:109 0:104
(0:008) (0:025) (0:025) (0:025) (0:028)
Female  0:296  0:295  0:306  0:296  0:300
(0:008) (0:008) (0:010) (0:009) (0:009)
Age 0:014 0:014 0:014 0:013 0:014
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
Age*age  0:000  0:000  0:000  0:000  0:000
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Low-skilled  0:303  0:306  0:313  0:311  0:304
(0:010) (0:010) (0:010) (0:010) (0:010)
Medium-skilled  0:187  0:191  0:195  0:194  0:190
(0:008) (0:008) (0:008) (0:008) (0:008)
Full-time 0:152 0:152 0:141 0:153 0:152
(0:014) (0:014) (0:015) (0:014) (0:014)
Tenure in months 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
20<size50 0:023 0:025 0:024 0:025 0:025
(0:011) (0:011) (0:011) (0:011) (0:011)
50<size100 0:033 0:034 0:030 0:036 0:036
(0:012) (0:012) (0:012) (0:012) (0:012)
100<size200 0:053 0:052 0:046 0:049 0:052
(0:013) (0:013) (0:013) (0:013) (0:013)
Size>200 0:097 0:093 0:000 0:101 0:094
(0:015) (0:015) (0:000) (0:015) (0:015)
Constant 2:145 2:151 2:155 2:156 2:145
(0:026) (0:028) (0:030) (0:028) (0:028)
R2 0:579 0:585 0:548 0:591 0:571
N 27640 27640 21986 26903 26873
Blue*post*sector + blue*post*sector*CA 0:117 0:112 0:100 0:120
(0:063) (0:064) (0:070) (0:066)
F-Test for dierential eects across coverage by a CA
... on intercept & slopes 31:88 33:51 34:63 30:46
... p-value 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
... on slopes 5:60 6:33 4:86 5:85
... p-value 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
Source: GSES 1995 and 2001.
Notes: standard errors clustered on the establishment level in parentheses. ***signicant at 1% level, **signicant at 5%
level, *signicant at 10% level. The dependent variable is log hourly wages. The reference category for establishment size
variables ("# <size #") is 20 or less employees. CA refers to collective, rm or establishment agreement. \DDD-CA"
stands for least squares estimation of the dierences-in-dierences-in-dierences specication dierentiated along union
status. \<200" restricts the sample to observations in establishments with up to 200 employees; \no rm CA" estimates
based on all observations except for those under rm or establishment level agreements; \no foremen" excludes foremen
and head masons from the white-collar workers control group.
34Table 9: Dierences-in-Dierences-in-Dierences Estimation Results for West
Germany
DDD DDD-CA DDD-CA DDD-CA DDD-CA
all all 200 no rm CA no foremen
Blue*post*sector 0:017 0:056 0:055 0:056 0:056
(0:020) (0:038) (0:040) (0:038) (0:041)
Blue*post*sector*CA  0:024  0:046  0:022  0:022
(0:044) (0:044) (0:044) (0:047)
Blue*post*CA  0:068  0:020  0:069  0:081
(0:033) (0:030) (0:033) (0:035)
Blue*sector*CA 0:074 0:070 0:075 0:086
(0:030) (0:033) (0:030) (0:032)
Post*sector*CA 0:059 0:061 0:056 0:056
(0:040) (0:040) (0:041) (0:044)
Blue*CA 0:050 0:004 0:050 0:058
(0:023) (0:022) (0:023) (0:023)
Post*CA 0:051 0:011 0:054 0:064
(0:032) (0:029) (0:032) (0:034)
Sector*CA  0:083  0:062  0:084  0:095
(0:027) (0:030) (0:027) (0:028)
Blue*post  0:003 0:037  0:009 0:037 0:050
(0:018) (0:027) (0:027) (0:027) (0:029)
Blue*sector  0:050  0:123  0:105  0:123  0:143
(0:013) (0:028) (0:031) (0:028) (0:030)
Post*sector 0:035  0:030  0:027  0:030  0:030
(0:020) (0:036) (0:038) (0:036) (0:039)
Blue  0:315  0:347  0:306  0:347  0:353
(0:011) (0:020) (0:020) (0:020) (0:021)
Post 0:039 0:013 0:062 0:013  0:000
(0:018) (0:027) (0:027) (0:026) (0:029)
Sector 0:047 0:124 0:110 0:124 0:144
(0:012) (0:026) (0:028) (0:026) (0:028)
With CA  0:037  0:064  0:024  0:064  0:071
(0:006) (0:021) (0:021) (0:021) (0:021)
Female  0:274  0:271  0:282  0:272  0:276
(0:007) (0:007) (0:008) (0:007) (0:008)
Age 0:016 0:016 0:017 0:016 0:016
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
Age*age  0:000  0:000  0:000  0:000  0:000
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Low-skilled  0:293  0:290  0:280  0:290  0:289
(0:006) (0:006) (0:006) (0:006) (0:006)
Medium-skilled  0:142  0:140  0:127  0:140  0:138
(0:004) (0:004) (0:004) (0:004) (0:004)
Full-time 0:119 0:121 0:132 0:122 0:121
(0:011) (0:011) (0:013) (0:011) (0:011)
Tenure in months 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
20<size50 0:033 0:033 0:031 0:033 0:033
(0:007) (0:007) (0:007) (0:007) (0:007)
50<size100 0:058 0:056 0:051 0:057 0:056
(0:008) (0:008) (0:008) (0:008) (0:008)
100<size200 0:089 0:087 0:000 0:088 0:087
(0:008) (0:008) (0:000) (0:008) (0:008)
Size>200 0:051 0:049 0:049 0:047
(0:009) (0:009) (0:009) (0:009)
Constant 2:499 2:513 2:439 2:512 2:518
(0:022) (0:026) (0:028) (0:026) (0:027)
R2 0:569 0:572 0:536 0:572 0:561
N 53651 53651 36939 53525 51680
Blue*post*sector + blue*post*sector*CA 0:033 0:009 0:035 0:034
(0:024) (0:023) (0:024) (0:026)
F-Test for dierential eects across coverage by a CA
... on intercept & slopes 11:03 3:01 11:02 11:96
... p-value 0:000 0:0023 0:000 0:000
... on slopes 8:01 1:78 8:16 9:23
... p-value 0:000 0:086 0:000 0:000
Source: GSES 1995 and 2001.
Notes: standard errors clustered on the establishment level in parentheses. ***signicant at 1% level, **signicant at 5%
level, *signicant at 10% level. The dependent variable is log hourly wages. The reference category for establishment size
variables ("# <size #") is 20 or less employees. CA refers to collective, rm or establishment agreement. \DDD-CA"
stands for least squares estimation of the dierences-in-dierences-in-dierences specication dierentiated along union
status. \<200" restricts the sample to observations in establishments with up to 200 employees; \no rm CA" estimates
based on all observations except for those under rm or establishment level agreements; \no foremen" excludes foremen
and head masons from the white-collar workers control group.
35Table 10: Dierences-in-Dierences-in-Dierences Results in the RIF Framework
East Germany West Germany
q25 q50 q75 q25 q50 q75
Blue*post*sector 0:128 0:080 0:111 0:027 0:038 0:045
(0:036) (0:031) (0:037) (0:029) (0:024) (0:048)
Blue*post*sector*CA 0:009 0:068 0:069  0:021 0:059 0:067
(0:079) (0:070) (0:087) (0:036) (0:032) (0:058)
Blue*post*CA  0:141  0:079  0:028  0:004  0:023  0:049
(0:075) (0:064) (0:077) (0:026) (0:024) (0:047)
Blue*sector*CA 0:096 0:123 0:083 0:042  0:008  0:087
(0:031) (0:028) (0:037) (0:026) (0:021) (0:044)
Post*sector*CA  0:055  0:057 0:005 0:026 0:016  0:005
(0:045) (0:042) (0:071) (0:021) (0:020) (0:048)
Blue*CA 0:055  0:002  0:078  0:039  0:033 0:004
(0:026) (0:024) (0:034) (0:019) (0:016) (0:037)
Post*CA 0:028 0:010  0:018  0:007  0:001 0:060
(0:042) (0:038) (0:065) (0:019) (0:017) (0:042)
Sector*CA  0:024 0:007  0:003  0:024  0:012 0:024
(0:020) (0:020) (0:033) (0:013) (0:013) (0:033)
Blue*post 0:016  0:043  0:100 0:051 0:035  0:012
(0:026) (0:023) (0:027) (0:019) (0:016) (0:034)
Blue*sector  0:016  0:039  0:111  0:001  0:007  0:058
(0:023) (0:019) (0:022) (0:023) (0:017) (0:037)
Post*sector  0:043  0:032  0:068  0:002  0:001  0:022
(0:023) (0:022) (0:034) (0:015) (0:015) (0:037)
Blue  0:167  0:203  0:311  0:090  0:177  0:544
(0:019) (0:016) (0:022) (0:015) (0:013) (0:033)
Post 0:073 0:082 0:116 0:025 0:026 0:034
(0:019) (0:018) (0:026) (0:013) (0:012) (0:030)
Sector 0:083 0:074 0:134 0:017 0:011 0:085
(0:016) (0:015) (0:021) (0:011) (0:011) (0:027)
With CA 0:077 0:080 0:117 0:045 0:024  0:045
(0:018) (0:017) (0:030) (0:011) (0:011) (0:030)
Low-skilled  0:180  0:239  0:335  0:295  0:239  0:290
(0:011) (0:012) (0:015) (0:008) (0:007) (0:011)
Female  0:110  0:116  0:250  0:085  0:117  0:391
(0:008) (0:008) (0:011) (0:005) (0:005) (0:014)
Age 0:017 0:014 0:007 0:021 0:015 0:012
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
Age*age  0:000  0:000  0:000  0:000  0:000  0:000
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Medium-skilled  0:073  0:097  0:206  0:045  0:101  0:191
(0:007) (0:009) (0:013) (0:003) (0:004) (0:008)
Full-time 0:117 0:094 0:103 0:054 0:030 0:058
(0:016) (0:014) (0:014) (0:009) (0:007) (0:012)
Tenure in months 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
20<size50 0:029 0:016 0:008 0:022 0:024 0:037
(0:014) (0:011) (0:010) (0:007) (0:007) (0:010)
50<size100 0:044 0:023 0:011 0:033 0:041 0:075
(0:016) (0:013) (0:012) (0:008) (0:007) (0:011)
100<size200 0:061 0:043 0:027 0:032 0:047 0:085
(0:015) (0:013) (0:014) (0:007) (0:007) (0:010)
Size>200 0:091 0:093 0:067 0:057 0:069 0:117
(0:016) (0:016) (0:017) (0:008) (0:008) (0:011)
Constant 1:714 2:043 2:548 2:051 2:418 2:946
(0:038) (0:028) (0:030) (0:024) (0:019) (0:034)
R2 0:273 0:349 0:414 0:280 0:356 0:478
N 27640 27640 27640 53651 53651 53651
Blue*post*sector*CA 0:137 0:149 0:181 0:006 0:098 0:112
+ Blue*post*sector (0:067) (0:059) (0:079) (0:020) (0:021) (0:036)
Source: GSES 1995 and 2001.
Notes: standard errors clustered on the establishment level in parentheses (3000 repetitions). ***signicant at 1% level, **signicant at
5% level, *signicant at 10% level. The dependent variable is log hourly wages. The reference category for establishment size variables
("# <size #") is 20 or less employees. \CA" refers to collective, rm or establishment agreement. Results from RIF regressions of the
dierences-in-dierences specication dierentiated along union status at the 25th, 50th and 75th quantile. See specication \DDD-CA"
in Tables 8 & 8 for the least squares analogues.
36Table 11: Summary of Eects from Dierences-in-Dierences-in-Dierences RIF Regressions for East and
West Germany




t w/o CA 0:210 0:195 0:103 0:104 0:080 0:076 0:111 0:124 0:156
(0:054) (0:039) (0:034) (0:035) (0:031) (0:029) (0:034) (0:044) (0:121)
with CA 0:124 0:124 0:104 0:161 0:149 0:173 0:173 0:205 0:164




t w/o CA 0:032 0:026 0:017 0:031 0:038 0:023 0:028 0:061 0:143
(0:053) (0:034) (0:024) (0:022) (0:024) (0:028) (0:035) (0:064) (0:108)
with CA 0:018 0:021 0:000 0:054 0:098 0:099 0:101 0:099  0:068
(0:027) (0:021) (0:019) (0:018) (0:021) (0:023) (0:030) (0:050) (0:074)
Source: GSES 1995 and 2001.
Notes: standard errors clustered on the establishment level in parentheses (3000 repetitions). ***signicant at 1% level, **signicant at 5% level, *signicant at 10%
level. Results from RIF regressions along the quantiles of the distribution of log hourly wages of the dierences-in-dierences-in-dierences specication dierentiated
along whether wage was agreed upon in some kind of a collective, rm or establishment agreement or not (DDD-CA). \CA" refers to collective, rm or establishment
agreement. Refer to Table 10 for full regression output at selected quantiles.
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